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A Framework for Resilience-based Governance of Social-Ecological
Systems
Ahjond S. Garmestani 1 and Melinda Harm Benson 2
ABSTRACT. Panarchy provides a heuristic to characterize the cross-scale dynamics of social-ecological systems and a
framework for how governance institutions should behave to be compatible with the ecosystems they manage. Managing for
resilience will likely require reform of law to account for the dynamics of social-ecological systems and achieve a substantive
mandate that accommodates the need for adaptation. In this paper, we suggest expansive legal reform by identifying the principles
of reflexive law as a possible mechanism for achieving a shift to resilience-based governance and leveraging cross-scale dynamics
to provide resilience-based responses to increasingly challenging environmental conditions.
Key Words: adaptive governance; adaptive management; environmental governance; intermediaries; panarchy; reflexive law;
resilience; resilience-based governance
INTRODUCTION
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005) confirms
that over the past 50 years humans have changed ecosystems
more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period
of time in human history. The MA further acknowledges that,
although these changes to ecosystems have contributed to
substantial net gains in human well-being and economic
development, they have come with growing costs associated
with the degradation of many ecosystem services and
increased risks of nonlinear changes. Like many experts in the
field, the MA authors emphasize the need for more flexible,
iterative, and adaptive approaches to governance to achieve
Millennium Development Goals. Although these approaches
are increasingly called for within the academic literature and
even within natural resource management agencies (e.g.,
Williams et al. 2009), many systems of governance still lack
the necessary flexibility to accommodate dynamic systems
(Liu et al. 2007, Ostrom 2009). In the U.S., ecosystem
management has had limited success because of entrained
institutional hierarchies, as well as the lack of favorable
legislation (Gelcich et al. 2010). This legal and institutional
rigidity can limit the experimentation necessary for
environmental governance in light of our current
understanding of the dynamics of ecological and social
systems (Garmestani et al. 2009a). This point is critical
because some scholars contend that environmental
governance can only succeed if rules, e.g., laws, evolve with
the system of interest (Dietz et al. 2003). The primary problems
with our current framework for environmental law are that it
does not often account for scale and tends to lock-in “fixes”
because of the need for certainty in the legal process
(Karkkainen 2006). This is particularly evident in the United
States, where a complex suite of regulatory frameworks often
constrains the management flexibility necessary to engage in
adaptive management (Craig 2010). Thus, managing for
resilience will likely require reform of law to account for the
dynamics of social-ecological systems (Cosens 2010, Benson
and Garmestani 2011a).  
Taking these points to heart, we concur with Flournoy and
Driesen (2010:XX) that “we cannot reliably protect a natural
resource legacy without a strong and enforceable substantive
mandate.” The question becomes how to achieve a substantive
mandate in a manner that accommodates the need for
adaptation, as well as enforceability at a broad scale that fosters
rather than diminishes creativity at smaller scales. Elsewhere,
we have suggested minor reforms (see Garmestani et al. 2009a,
Benson and Garmestani 2011a, 2011b) to the law to manage
for resilience. In this paper, we suggest more expansive legal
reform by identifying the principles of reflexive law as a
possible mechanism for achieving a shift to resilience-based
governance and leveraging cross-scale dynamics to provide
resilience-based responses to increasingly challenging
environmental conditions. We first present the critical features
to our resilience-based governance framework by
summarizing resilience and panarchy, adaptive management
and adaptive governance, and reflexive law. We discuss the
critical features of resilience-based governance, and we treat
the reflexive mechanisms that could allow governance to
better mimic social-ecological systems. We then illustrate this
integration of resilience science, i.e., panarchy, adaptive
management, and adaptive governance, with reflexive law via
an example application to a social-ecological system, i.e.,
Florida Bay, USA, followed by a summary of
recommendations for resilience-based governance.
RESILIENCE AND PANARCHY
Resilience is the capacity of a complex system to remain within
a regime in the face of external perturbations and/or internal
change (Holling 1973). When a complex system is forced
beyond the boundaries of a regime, i.e., a regime shift, the new
regime is typically characterized by a new set of structures
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and processes. An adaptive cycle describes the processes of
development and decay in a system, and captures the dynamic
character of structures and processes in complex systems
(Gunderson and Holling 2002). A panarchy is a nested set of
adaptive cycles (Fig. 1; Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Panarchy differs from hierarchy in that conditions can arise
that trigger “bottom-up,” i.e., cross-scale cascading, change
in the system (Garmestani et al. 2009b). Because of this subtle,
but critical difference, the panarchy model does a better job
of capturing the dynamics of complex systems, e.g.,
“surprise.” Further, levels in a panarchy are not static states,
but rather adaptive cycles that are interconnected to other
adaptive cycles in the panarchy. Each cycle operates over a
discrete range of scale in both time and space and is connected
to adjacent levels (adaptive cycles). Adaptive cycles do not
exist in isolation. Because adaptive cycles operate over
specific ranges of scale, a system’s resilience is dependent
upon the interactions between structure and dynamics at
multiple scales (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Panarchy was
developed to specifically address issues of scale, as well as
cross-scale dynamics (Groffman et al. 2006).
Fig. 1. A classic representation of a panarchy: a nested set
of adaptive cycles. Adapted from Gunderson and Holling
(2002).
In ecosystems, different processes and structures dominate at
different spatial and temporal scales. Small and fast processes
and structures dominate at small scales, whereas large and
slow processes and structures dominate at larger scales (Allen
et al. 2011a). These processes and structures are separated by
discontinuities that are thresholds between adaptive cycles in
a panarchy. A threshold is the point at which a system has lost
enough resilience, where change occurs in the processes and
structures of the system, and results in the system reorganizing
into a new regime characterized by a different set of processes
and structures (Groffman et al. 2006). Understanding
thresholds is essential to managing for resilience, and requires
an immense amount of information and focus on novel ways
in which to characterize thresholds, and therefore, regime
shifts. Thresholds are upper and lower level indicators, and
can be defined as management goals that represent the current
understanding of the conditions of a system (Smith et al. 2009).
When a threshold is reached or is predicted to be reached,
management actions can be applied, and thresholds can be
recalibrated in an adaptive manner if new information suggests
the threshold is incorrect (Smith et al. 2009). Thresholds
should be treated as hypotheses to be put at risk with
monitoring data and represent the multidimensional regime in
which variation is acceptable for system resilience (Smith et
al. 2009). When working to establish thresholds for specific
“slow variables,” thresholds should be categorized, i.e.,
known, strongly suspected, and if possible, to establish the
degree of confidence in the threshold estimates (Walker et al.
2009). The identification or “setting” of thresholds is very
difficult, and fraught with uncertainty, but is an essential
component in resilience science (Walker et al. 2009). Thus,
thresholds should be set that can shift with improved
information because ignoring this critical aspect to managing
for resilience almost guarantees failure in environmental
governance (Susskind et al. 2012).
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ADAPTIVE
GOVERNANCE
Both adaptive management and adaptive governance are
vehicles for putting resilience theory into practice. Adaptive
management is an environmental management strategy that
attempts to reduce the inherent uncertainty in ecosystems
(Green and Garmestani 2012). Adaptive management operates
in an iterative manner, rather than providing discrete
conclusions based on science, acknowledging that our
understanding of natural systems is constantly evolving
(Benson 2010a). A central tenant of adaptive management is
that “management involves a continual learning process that
cannot conveniently be separated into functions like ‘research’
and ongoing ‘regulatory activities,’ and probably never
converges to a state of blissful equilibrium involving full
knowledge and optimum productivity” (Walters 1986:8-9,
Walters and Holling 1990). Adaptive management often takes
place within more conventional governance frameworks. For
example, the U.S. Department of Interior has embraced an
adaptive management approach to many of its ongoing
activities (Williams et al. 2009). Organizational conditions
have an impact on outcomes from an adaptive management
paradigm. In an assessment of the Northwest Forest Plan, a
large-scale environmental management project that included
adaptive management, Bormann et al. (2007) concluded that
adaptive management can be effective if: (1) collaboration
Ecology and Society 18(1): 9
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss1/art9/
exists between scientists and managers; and (2) adaptive
management is formalized as core agency business. Doremus
(2001) contends that it may be possible to combine finality
and flexibility via incremental decisions that can be revisited
after monitoring for a period of time appropriate to the
environmental resource of interest. In essence, the legal
framework would need to be reformed to accommodate
dynamic processes. Adaptive management is unlikely to be
effective without legal reform, and without adaptive
management, environmental governance is unlikely to
succeed (see Ruhl 2005). For example, if the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) were to be reconfigured to
integrate adaptive management and account for resilience,
several specific reforms are necessary (see Benson and
Garmestani 2011b). This model shifts NEPA’s process from
a linear model to an iterative process better suited to dynamic
systems. Similarly, it moves the theoretical advancements of
panarchy and resilience into practical consideration by natural
resource managers.  
Adaptive governance is a form of governance that is dependent
upon adaptive management and incorporates formal
institutions, informal groups/networks, and individuals at
multiple scales for purposes of collaborative environmental
management (Folke et al. 2005). Cosens (2010) notes the
broadened understanding of adaptive governance to include
not only formal legal frameworks and institutions but also
collaboration and cooperation across different levels of
government, as well as nongovernmental and individual action
(see also Huitema et al. 2009). There has recently been
amplified interest in developing environmental management
approaches that are based upon the scale of interest and
collaboration, e.g., adaptive governance (Karkkainen 2006).
Within this context, governance includes the organizations
and actors that implement the laws, regulations, and programs
for environmental management in formal and informal ways
(Hennessey 1994, Hughes et al. 2005). Adaptive governance
requires the capacity to learn to manage for resilience, and
thus any institutional arrangement that does not have this
capacity is not appropriate for managing social-ecological
systems (Hennessey 1994). Bridging organizations, enabling
legislation, and government policies can also contribute to the
success of an adaptive governance framework; governance
creates a vision and management actualizes the vision (Folke
et al. 2005). Social networks also have the capacity to allow
for development of new ideas, to facilitate communication
between entities, and to create the flexibility necessary for the
interplay of the fluid (ecological systems) and the rigid
(organizations) for successful environmental management
(Folke et al. 2005). Leadership has been well established as a
critical factor in facilitating good environmental management
(Folke et al. 2005, Steelman and Tucker 2005). Leaders
develop and facilitate a vision for environmental management,
incorporating local knowledge and information from social
networks (Folke et al. 2005). Because a degree of uncertainty
is inherent in social-ecological systems, the generation of
adaptive capacity in management entities is a necessary
“insurance policy” for sustainability (Gunderson 1999).
Adaptive capacity in social-ecological systems is
characterized by open and frequent lines of communication,
collaboration, and action between both formal and informal
institutions at multiple scales.  
Another key component of adaptive governance is polycentric
systems (Folke et al. 2005). Polycentric systems are complex
adaptive systems without a central authority controlling the
processes and structures of the systems (Andersson and
Ostrom 2008). Polycentric systems are characterized by
multiple governance units at multiple scales, with each unit
having some capacity to govern at its scale (Ostrom 2010).
Local knowledge of ecological and social conditions is often
a critical aspect to managing for resilience, and polycentric
systems are designed to allow for this knowledge to shape
governance (Janssen et al. 2007, Ostrom 2010). Polycentric
systems are better adapted to social-ecological dynamics
because these coupled systems of governance and
management effectively link scales via diverse information
flow capabilities (Beier et al. 2009, Ostrom 2010). The
dynamics of social-ecological systems make it necessary to
create or nurture governance systems that utilize a suite of
policy instruments (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). Fostering
good environmental governance is context-specific, and
although generalized guidance that accounts for scale may be
useful, a “blueprint formula” for environmental governance
is a recipe for disaster (Andersson and Ostrom 2008).
REFLEXIVE LAW
Resilience science, i.e., panarchy, adaptive management, and
adaptive governance, can be integrated into environmental
governance with concepts from reflexive law. Reflexive law
is an area of law developed in Europe that appears to have
some promising aspects for purposes of environmental
governance in the U.S. (Teubner 1983). Reflexive law
emerged as an alternative legal framework for regulation
between government-imposed regulatory requirements and
neoliberal movements toward privatization (Calliess 2001).
The concept of reflexive law arises from both systems and
critical theories, more specifically the systems theory of Niklas
Luhmann and discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas (Calliess
2001, Scheuerman 2001). It addresses the nature in which
substantive law imposes specific societal values and
substantive social aims through enforceable frameworks
(Capps and Olsen 2002). As a result, “the legal system
becomes insensitive to the normative autonomy of other
subsystems” (Capps and Olsen 2002:551). By contrast,
reflexive law “shifts theoretical focus from the level of norms
to the level of communication” (Calliess 2001).  
Reflexive law, in the classic sense, does not regulate the
outcome of social processes but rather installs, corrects, and
redefines democratic self-regulatory mechanisms (Teubner
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1983). The goal of reflexive law is to produce a better fit
between institutional and social structures via facilitation, as
opposed to comprehensive regulation (Teubner 1983). In an
applied context, Nolon (2009:8) suggests that reflexive law
might serve as a means by which a legal system “imposes
procedural, rather than substantive requirements that are
designed to trigger reflexive responses among those
implicated in the problem that the proscribed features are
designed to solve.” Essentially, reflexive law seeks to
determine the organizational and procedural aspects of
regulated action (Fiorino 1999). Thus, instead of detailed rules
for a specific environmental issue, e.g., air quality or energy
conservation, reflexive environmental law provides a
procedural process with room for innovation (Orts 1995).
Some reflexive law proponents argue that traditional law must
transition in response to the stratification of society into
different forms of organization that require a legal framework
that matches such organization (Teubner 1983). For example,
reflexive law identifies the structures that allow regulation to
deal with environmental problems (Teubner 1983). Another
aspect of reflexive law that is appealing for managing for
resilience is its recognition of the importance of learning for
the legal process (Teubner 1983). Reflexive law is also
concerned with process, which is an aspect of the theory that
works well with managing for resilience, if the process is scale-
dependent and iterative, i.e., “back-ended”.  
Although this aspect of reflexive environmental law is
appealing for scale-dependent management, for it to be legally
sound, there would need to be a modification because the “slow
variables”, and therefore the threshold for a particular
environmental issue would need to be established (see Walker
et al. 2009). Thus, the process has freedom for innovation, so
long as there are trigger points for management actions, i.e.,
thresholds. Government would set the standards or goals for
a particular action, but work with regulated entities to achieve
the outcome, which may change in response to new
information regarding the system (Fiorino 1999, Allen et al.
2011b).  
There are other reforms that would improve the aspects of
reflexive law that are useful for managing for resilience. Dorf
(2003) has advocated for a version of reflexive law that
incorporates top-down, as well as bottom-up aspects of data
collection and integration into the management paradigm.
Dorf’s adaptation of reflexive law, which he discusses within
the context of sexual privacy, is an appealing add-on to classic
regulatory law, i.e., command and control. In particular, the
top-down and bottom-up flow of data and therefore
information between scales would likely do a better job of
mimicking social-ecological dynamics. This variation of
reflexive law has potential for environmental management
because thresholds can be set, but the path to get there is left
to development at relevant scales. Further, the iterative nature
of this version of reflexive law would likely make it more
palpable to modify thresholds in light of emerging information
on the dynamics of social-ecological systems. Dorf (2003)
characterizes this version of reflexive law as “rolling
regulation,” which appears to be a useful mechanism by which
the legal and regulatory system could better mimic the
ecological systems they are tasked with managing. Thus, it
may be possible to integrate reflexive elements into decision
making frameworks within agencies to foster creativity and
communication between refined scales, e.g., those taking
resilience-based actions on the ground, and higher (broader)
scales of authority.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESILIENCE-BASED
GOVERNANCE
Environmental management is more likely to succeed when
governance is tuned to the social-ecological systems it
manages (van Bueren and ten Heuvelhof 2005). It is unlikely
that a new institutional arrangement will replace the current
natural resource management organizational hierarchy in the
United States in the near future. Organizational change is very
expensive, and negative feedbacks operate to maintain the
status quo for a variety of reasons, e.g., sunk costs, interaction
patterns, interdependencies (van Bueren and ten Heuvelhof
2005). For this reason, reform of governance mechanisms is
likely to proceed in an incremental fashion (van Bueren and
ten Heuvelhof 2005). Most natural resource management
organizational hierarchies are currently built around
assumptions of stability in ecological systems, which can be
managed for “sustained-yield” (Craig 2010). Although this
approach has worked to some extent, a more rapidly changing
environment warrants a reformed organizational arrangement
to better mimic and respond to ecosystem dynamics. To shift
to resilience-based governance, we should integrate resilience
science, i.e., panarchy, adaptive management, and adaptive
governance, with reflexive law and we offer suggestions for
manifesting this transition.  
Complex, cross-scale problems demand that information and
innovations be shared across scales for good environmental
management (Moore and Westley 2011). Organizational
structures and requirements could be reworked to more
creatively delegate management responsibilities between
large and smaller scales utilizing reflexive mechanisms. To
some extent, this occurs already because delegation is a
familiar concept within many environmental legal
frameworks. Many requirements under the Clean Air Act, for
example, combine national standards with state implementation.
That said, the current level of flexibility is limited. In most
cases, federal law largely proscribes how state implementation
will take place, rather than allowing states to create their own
processes and procedures. In addition, these approaches are
still tied to traditional scales of governance, which ignores the
capacity for new scales of governance to emerge. There are
several mechanisms for accelerating the process of
organizational modification. First, organizational learning can
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be facilitated by communication and information flow
between levels in organizations operating at different scales.
To improve environmental governance, federal and state level
natural resource organizations can improve their capacity to
rapidly receive, digest, and act upon communication and
information from smaller scales (Westley 1995). An
innovation that emerges at a small-scale can sometimes “scale-
up” if adequate networks exist at the scale of the innovation,
as well as higher scales, with cross-scale linkages (Moore and
Westley 2011). It is likely that there are certain network
structures that are essential to initiate and support innovation
across scales, and have the capacity to address complex
problems (Moore and Westley 2011).  
Natural resource management agencies often do not adapt their
management schemes in response to new information about
the system of interest because they lack the programmatic
infrastructure for learning (Camacho 2009). The explicit
requirement of organizational learning is rarely incorporated
into natural resources management. Intermediaries, e.g.,
networks, can provide the capacity to link organizations at
multiple scales, which in turn creates the capacity for cross-
scale organizational learning via information exchange,
communication, and deliberation (Reed et al. 2010).
Gunderson et al. (2006) contend that learning can be facilitated
via networks, but these networks need venues for dialogue and
debate. Universities, for example, can act as venues for this
critical role for networks (Camacho 2011). For networks to
enhance resilience they must be: (1) open in their connections
beyond the scale of interest; and (2) have flexibility within the
context of the existing institutional and organizational
hierarchy (Gunderson et al. 2006).  
Enhancements in information sharing can be utilized because
communication and learning are essential elements in
managing for resilience (Gunderson et al. 2006, Longstaff and
Yang 2008). In a study of adaptive comanagement of natural
resources in South Africa, Cundill and Fabricius (2010) also
found that creating the conditions for self-organization, i.e.,
cross-scale linkages, in addition to funding for long-term
social learning and information flow, is critical for manifesting
sound environmental management. Communication between
experts and decision makers must be active, iterative, and
inclusive for effective system management (Cash et al. 2003).
Cash et al. (2003) found that if communication was infrequent
or occurred only at the inception of a project, the effectiveness
of the project declined. Camacho (2009) advocates for a
framework that promotes interagency information sharing and
a recommendation that Congress require agencies to monitor
and adapt their policies in response to changing conditions.
Information sharing could be further facilitated by the
formation of a publicly accessible information clearinghouse
(Camacho 2009). Camacho (2009) also asserts that Congress
should require agencies to implement adaptive governance
that would: (1) require and provide funding for monitoring;
and (2) require the creation, monitoring, and adjustment of
adaptive management plans and overall agency programs.
Clearly, promoting communication between actors in a social-
ecological system is a critical element for resilience-based
governance (Cash et al. 2003).  
Second, adaptive capacity can be fostered via more specific
and sustained cultivation of intermediaries, which can be
creative so long as communication and information flow
occur. Organizations moving forward will require both the
ability to take advantage of formal rules at a broad scale, while
also fostering the creativity and innovation that occurs at
smaller scales. The problems associated with scale are not
endemic to formal organizational hierarchies; rather, the
problem of how to link discrete scales is known to be an issue
in collaborative ventures as well (Prager 2010). As has been
documented by several researchers, to manifest sound
environmental management, an intermediary, e.g., bridging
organization, is critical to facilitate communication between
levels in a hierarchy (Olsson et al. 2006, Prager 2010). Cash
and Moser (2000) have proposed a set of guidelines for
environmental governance in this regard: (1) utilize boundary
organizations; (2) account for scale by allocating resources,
and engaging technical expertise and decision making
authority that best matches the scale of the system; and (3)
utilize adaptive management. Cash and Moser (2000) contend
that boundary organizations operate as “information
brokerages” and communicators of research needs for a system
of interest.  
The federalist literature researches how government actions
at one scale influence the actions of government at other scales
(Cash and Moser 2000). However, delegating management
responsibilities from large to smaller scales is most effective
when implemented by enabling policies developed at the large
scale, e.g., federal level, but supplemented by intermediaries
(Cash and Moser 2000, Garmestani et al. 2009a). Bridging
organizations and networks are advocated as the method to
improve environmental management, yet there is no mandate
for their formation. Intermediaries are simply expected to
emerge via the self-organization of the institutional milieu.
Research has been conducted upon informal mechanisms, for
example, bridging organizations, informal networks, and
shadow networks, but relatively little research has addressed
the formal mechanisms, i.e., legal mechanisms, to manifest
the inclusion of informal mechanisms into environmental
governance. Policy makers should explore how to foster
intermediaries because allowing for communication is
essential to managing for resilience (Prager 2010). Scientific
information must inform policy and management at multiple
scales, but there is often a disconnect between science and
management, so intermediaries, e.g., bridging organizations,
must bridge the disconnect, i.e., threshold, between scales in
an organizational hierarchy (Tribbia and Moser 2008,
Garmestani et al. 2009a). The bridging function served by
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intermediaries has the capacity to create improved policy
options because of the tightening of the feedback between
science and managers in an iterative manner.  
Third, it may be necessary to rethink interactions between
formal rules or informal arrangements for ecosystem
management. In a study of a marine reserve network in the
Gulf of California, Mexico, Cudney-Bueno and Basurto
(2009) analyzed commons problems and found that there are
no clear answers; rather, the resolution of commons problems
was often scale-dependent. They found that rules created and
enforced at a local scale resulted in a rapid increase in resource
abundance. However, as information “scaled up” from the
local scale to a regional scale, outsiders moved in and began
poaching, resulting in a dramatic negative effect on the fishery
and compliance with the locally created rules (Cudney-Bueno
and Basurto 2009). Cudney-Bueno and Basurto (2009)
demonstrate that cooperative management of common pool
resources can emerge quickly at a local scale, but without
cross-scale linkages to formal rules and governance at regional
and national scales, a locally managed resource can quickly
fall prey to outsiders, e.g., poachers, to the locally-derived
governance arrangements. Thus, cooperation and social
capital are simply not enough when creating a natural resource
management scheme (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009).  
In the U.S., regional networks offer promise in this regard.
One example is the U.S. Fire Learning Network (FLN), a
collaboration between federal natural resource agencies and
The Nature Conservancy formed in 2002. Butler and Goldstein
(2010) contend FLN is an example of a network that has
overcome what they refer to as “rigidity traps,” which in this
case involved the role of fire suppression in forest
management, when scientific evidence indicated that
restoration of fire regimes was a more sound long-term policy
choice. FLN has allowed for more effective communication
and information exchange, which in turn has created
opportunities for innovation in fire management. Encouraging
collaboration between NGOs and government has the capacity
to improve environmental management (Imperial 1999).
Further, the work done at FLN has resulted in the scaling up
of policy innovations at the regional network scale to affect
federal fire and land management policy, but importantly,
change has been incremental at this stage in the process (Butler
and Goldstein 2010). Regional climate initiatives also provide
relevant examples in this regard (see Benson 2010b).
EXAMPLE: FLORIDA BAY
The governance of Florida Bay offers an illustration of the
above recommendations. The Florida Bay is a 2200 km²
estuary at the southern end of the State of Florida (Gunderson
and Holling 2002). A regime shift occurred in the Florida Bay
in the early 1990s in which the system shifted from an
oligotrophic state to a turbid state dominated by phytoplankton
blooms (Groffman et al. 2006). This shift resulted in changes
in processes such as water clarity, primary production, nutrient
cycling, and food webs (Groffman et al. 2006). The regime
shift was likely driven by a combination of human and natural
factors, including increased nutrients from septic systems,
drought, water diversion, and removal of grazers (Groffman
et al. 2006). A further complicating factor is that driver
variables in the system operate at different scales, with some
variables that responded to perturbation quickly, e.g., water
clarity, and some that responded slowly, e.g., salinity. The
critical aspect is that research is ongoing, and geared toward
establishing quantitative thresholds for factors driven by
human activity (Groffman et al. 2006).  
We can characterize the Florida Bay regime shift based on the
scale of the process and impact of interest. Once we have the
ecosystem scales established, we can use the panarchy model
to delineate the scale at which the associated management
entities operate. Panarchy allows us to reconceptualize social-
ecological systems in a manner that has the capacity to better
match governance to the environment. Matching governance
and ecosystems is a persistent problem (Folke et al. 2007,
Olsson et al. 2007) that requires aspects of adaptive
management, adaptive governance, and reflexive mechanisms,
e.g., monitoring and iteration of policy. For example,
characterizing the responsibilities of management agencies,
that is, local, state, regional, national, and international, for
the Florida Bay at a variety of scales provides us with a better
understanding of the “fit” between governance and the
environment. The scale-dependent features of the panarchy
model are very useful in this respect. This characterization of
a social-ecological system can help identify areas where there
is a poor fit between management and ecosystems, and this is
very useful because the characterization of appropriate scale
in the Florida Bay example is fraught with problems. For
instance, can Florida Bay be seen as distinct from the
Everglades, the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic Ocean, Florida,
the southeastern U.S., the U.S., or even the planet? This
quandary highlights the critical importance of cultivating
cross-scale linkages to manifest sound environmental
governance. Having said all that, we have to be able to partition
systems into scales in some manner, or our attempts to deal
with these environmental issues are likely to fail. Thus, in this
example, the first step in characterizing management of the
Florida Bay is to delineate the management levels and social-
ecological scales that affect the system. The Bay itself is the
smallest scale in this example, the Everglades is the next scale
up, followed by Florida, and the United States. We recognize
that we are excluding the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic Ocean,
and the planet from this panarchy, but at this stage, we are
trying to provide a representative example of the problem of
scale for environmental governance (Fig. 2). The Bay is
governed by multiple federal, e.g., NPS; state, e.g., Florida
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission; and local
agencies, e.g., county and municipal natural resource entities;
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Table 1. Summary of elements necessary for the integration of resilience science, i.e., panarchy, adaptive management and
adaptive governance, and reflexive law as applied to the Florida Bay example.
 
 
• Delineate scale: Managing for resilience entails characterizing ecological and governance scales, e.g., Florida Bay, State of Florida. Panarchy (Gunderson
and Holling 2002) is a powerful tool for characterizing linked social-ecological systems.
• Identify critical slow variables: Because we have yet to develop the capacity to measure system resilience (but see Allen et al. 2005), “surrogates” should
be developed when conducting resilience science (Carpenter et al. 2005). Resilience surrogates are based upon stakeholder assessments, models, historical
profiling, and case studies (Carpenter et al. 2005).
• Identify scale-dependent ecological thresholds: Researchers should use models and scenario analysis to reveal processes that act to stabilize or destabilize
a system, which could lead to identification of resilience surrogates (Carpenter et al. 2005). Examples of resilience surrogates include distance of a system
variable from a system threshold; the rate at which a system variable is moving toward or away from a threshold; and external perturbations, e.g., shocks,
controls, that could change the rate of change of a system variable (Bennett et al. 2005).
• Link those ecological thresholds to legal thresholds: The panarchy framework, when coupled with scenario analysis, nonlinear modeling, and leading
indicators (Scheffer et al. 2012), should use a detailed analysis of a specific ecosystem to apply theory to real-world situations (Groffman et al. 2006).
Intermediaries and local knowledge should also be tapped. This should allow governance to reflexively recalibrate the linked thresholds in an iterative
manner based upon new information.
 
NGOs, e.g., Everglades Foundation; and universities, e.g.,
University of Florida. The Everglades is governed by multiple
federal, e.g., NPS; state, e.g., Florida Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission; and local agencies, e.g., county
and municipal natural resource entities; NGOs, e.g.,
Everglades Foundation; and universities, e.g., University of
Florida. The State of Florida is governed by multiple federal,
e.g., NPS; state, e.g., Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission; and local agencies, e.g., county and municipal
natural resource entities. The United States is governed by
multiple federal agencies, e.g., NPS.  
We can clearly see in Figure 2 that environmental governance
of the Florida Bay will require cross- and within-scale
information flow and communication. Leaders and networks
focused upon the Florida Bay can serve to generate active
communication between experts and decision makers.
Further, this organizational learning can be fostered by
intermediaries, and in the Florida Bay this role could be filled
by a university, e.g., University of Florida, or perhaps an NGO,
e.g., Everglades Foundation. This recommendation dovetails
nicely because the adaptive capacity of the Florida Bay can
be enhanced by the active cultivation of intermediaries.
Whether the cultivation of intermediaries should be best left
to informal or formal arrangements is a judgment call, and
should be left to the stakeholders in the Florida Bay, at this
stage.  
The Florida Bay example provides generalized guidance for
manifesting the transition toward resilience-based governance
in social-ecological systems (Table 1). Sound environmental
governance appears to depend upon creating the conditions
that allow for synergism between the hierarchy of
organizations and institutions, rather than creating a broad,
top-down arrangement that has the capacity to stymie
creativity and innovation.
Fig. 2. Environmental governance of the Florida Bay: the
combination of panarchy, adaptive management and
adaptive governance, and reflexive law. In this panarchy,
the United States is at the top scale, Florida the next scale,
followed by the Everglades, and then Florida Bay at the
smallest ecological scale. Federal, state, and local
management agencies are linked to their scales of
governance, and an intermediary, e.g., bridging
organization, is offered as the vehicle to fill gaps in “scale-
matching,” and to facilitate communication and information
flow. Map of USA (www.usgs.gov/state); Map of Florida
(www.florida-map.org/topo-map.htm).
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CONCLUSION
Often management organizations are not matched with the
scales they manage; in short, accounting for scale is critical
for sound environmental management (Karkkainen 2006,
Garmestani et al. 2009a). Thus, our current understanding of
social-ecological systems indicates that we will need to
incorporate a degree of flexibility into the future design of
environmental policy (Fiorino 1999). Existing regulatory law
is typically characterized by regulation via command and
control (Scheuerman 2001). Karkkainen (2006) contends that
law can be flexible with respect to standards for environmental
management that reflect the dynamics of ecological systems,
but will require reform at the organizational and legal level.
Craig and Ruhl (2010:1) have argued that governance of
coastal ecosystems should shift to place-based, i.e., scale-
specific, adaptive management regimes that utilize a suite of
“innovative and flexible regulatory instruments.” This
position is very similar to one taken by Garmestani et al.
(2009a), which advocated for panarchy couched within the
context of adaptive governance as a policy option for “sound”
environmental management, utilizing a suite of policy
instruments that are tailored for the appropriate scale to be
managed. 
Reflexive law establishes procedural and organizational
norms, but does not establish specific “outcomes” as the end
result of the process (Sheuerman 2001). To manage for
resilience, scale-specific “slow variables” will need to be
identified, taking into account cross-scale dynamics, and the
process by which government and regulated entities arrive at
prescribed outcomes should be open to novel solutions.
Federal agencies thus will have an oversight role that is
necessary to insure that outcomes are met, but not dictate the
process by which said outcomes are realized. Reflexive law
allows for iterative processes in the law and policy process.
In particular, learning occurs over time, and some laws will
need to be revamped or done away with, whereas more
complex problems may require superseding legislation (Orts
2011). Orts (2011) contends that a bottom-up legal process
has the capacity to be better than comprehensive approaches,
in that the environmental problem, e.g., climate change, can
be divided into different categories. Then, policy makers can
determine which regulatory and/or market strategies are most
appropriate and at which scales (Orts 2011). 
We proceeded along this line of inquiry under the assumption
that sound environmental governance is not possible in the U.
S. without formal, and therefore enforceable rules governing
information flow and communication between natural
resource organizations at multiple scales. Although we
advocate for allowing flexibility, e.g., local governance, in
scale-dependent management options, the cross-scale nature
of the dynamics of linked social-ecological systems makes it
necessary for a federal government agency to ultimately be
responsible for and have final decision making authority
(Gaines 2003). Resilience-based governance will require
organizational learning, cross-scale linkages, and adaptive
capacity to govern in a more flexible, iterative, and adaptive
manner. We suggest a framework of resilience-based
governance of social-ecological systems, which focuses upon
the integration of resilience science, i.e., panarchy, adaptive
management, and adaptive governance, with reflexive law.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
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